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ABSTRACT Online decision support for effective mitigation actions against propagating cascading 
outages in a power grid still poses a big challenge to grid operators. This paper proposes an online 
mitigation strategy against cascading outages using an optimal power flow model based on a Dynamic 
Interaction Graph.  For a given power grid, its interaction graph, also called an interaction model, was 
proposed in recent literature, which is composed of components and links that have large contributions to 
outage propagation. Differing from a conventional interaction graph, a Dynamic Interaction Graph can 
adaptively update its parameters with changes of grid topology and hence is more accurate in online 
identification of the most vulnerable transmission lines and likely outage propagation paths for mitigation. 
Further, the paper introduces an optimal power flow model based on the proposed Dynamic Interaction 
Graph for determining the optimal control strategy to maintain transfer margins of vulnerable transmission 
lines and effectively mitigate outage propagation. The numerical results on the IEEE 118-bus system 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models and associated control strategy. 
INDEX TERMS Cascading outages, Dynamic Interaction Graph, optimal power flow, mitigation actions.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cascading outages are the leading causes of large-scale 
blackouts, e.g., the 2003 Northeast blackout [1], the 2011 
Arizona-southern California blackout [2] and the 2012 Indian 
blackout [3]. In practice, online contingency analysis can 
reduce the risk of cascading outages by identifying 
potentially overloaded system components. However, it may 
not foresee all possible cascading outages since the operating 
condition keeps changing. Also, once cascading outages are 
initiated, network topology may dramatically change in an 
unpredictable manner [4], so online decision support to 
effectively mitigate propagating cascading outages still poses 
a big challenge to transmission system operators. 
Because of the low-probability nature of cascading 
outages, limited historical data do not present a variety of 
ways in which cascading outages propagate in power 
systems. Alternatively, by using the cascading outage 
models, cascading outage data can be generated by computer 
simulations. These models are such as the hidden failure 
model [5], Manchester model [6], [7], CASCADE model [8], 
the collection of OPA models [9]-[15], dynamic and quasi-
dynamic models [16]-[18], PRA model [19], sandpile model 
[20]. Analyzing these outage data using statistical tools 
provides a feasible way to understand the patterns in which 
outages propagate in a power grid. Ref. [21] analyzed the 
influence of weather on cascading outages. Ref. [22] and [23] 
studied how to fast identify vulnerable lines. Ref. [24]-[26] 
analyzed the impacts of cyber-attacks on power grids 
vulnerability to cascading outages, and Ref. [27], [28] 
studied mitigation and recovery approaches from cascading 
failures. 
Recently, study cascading outages based on graph methods 
has been developed rapidly. In the early stage, topological 
network models in which the nodes denote buses and the 
links denote transmission lines are adopted to study 
cascading outages [29]-[31]. However, practical component 
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outages can propagate non-locally and the next component to 
fail after a particular line outage can be distant. On the other 
hand, in order to model outage propagation paths, several 
graph-based models have been proposed, which can be 
constructed from simulated outage data, and can help analyze 
the ways how cascading outages propagate in a particular 
system. For instance, the influence graph used in [32] and 
[33] uses nodes of the graph to represent transmission lines, 
and edges to measure influences between outages of 
transmission lines. Ref. [34] proposes an interaction graph 
model to identify the critical components of a power system 
and key linkages of component failures under outage 
propagation using a dataset of cascading outages. This model 
is then improved in [35] by Expectation Maximization 
algorithm for more efficient computation. Ref. [36] future 
extends the single-layer interaction graph to a multi-layer 
interaction graph, where each layer focuses on one aspect of 
outage propagation, e.g., the number of line outages, the 
amount of load loss, and the electrical distance of the outage 
propagation. These interaction graph models provide an 
effective way to understanding the propagation mechanism 
of cascading outages, and are promising for online 
applications since the trend and consequences of outage 
propagation are immediately foreseen directly from an 
interaction graph without much computation efforts once it is 
constructed offline.  
Thus, for effective online mitigation of ongoing cascading 
outages, an interaction graph model that has been built 
offline will need to be updated online to adapt to ongoing 
outages and take into account real-time operations. How to 
dynamically maintain a more adaptive interaction graph 
model and design associated mitigation strategy has not been 
studied in literature. 
This paper extends the interaction graph model in [34] to a 
Dynamic Interaction Graph (DIG), which are constructed 
offline from historical or simulated cascading outage data 
and also updated online according to ongoing outages. The 
graph tells the key components of the power grid that play 
crucial roles in the propagation of outages.  
In practice, there are plenty of approaches to alleviating 
transmission line overloads in grid operations, such as load 
shedding [37], generation re-dispatch [38], line switching 
[39], and flexible power flow adjustment of FACTS devices 
[40]-[43]. In particular, FACTS devices are very effective in 
mitigating transmission line overloads in both HVAC and 
HVDC networks. Any of the aforementioned approaches that 
reduce the tripping probabilities (overloading rate) of the 
dynamically changing key components are feasible to be 
applied in the proposed DIG-based online mitigation method. 
Since proactive generation re-dispatch is a promising and 
practical mitigation measure against cascading outages, this 
paper focuses on integration of generation re-dispatch into a 
mitigation strategy using the proposed DIG based optimal 
power flow (OPF) model. 
The main contributions of this paper include:  
1) The proposed DIG model is online updated with 
happening outages and changes in the operating condition 
and is more accurate in predicting propagation of outages;  
2) The proposed DIG based OPF model includes a new 
inequality constraint on key components of the DIG, and can 
identify effective mitigation control actions for increasing 
transfer margins against a next outage. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II briefly introduces the interaction graph model. 
Section III elaborates the proposed DIG model, the DIG 
based OPF model, and the associated mitigation strategy. 
Section IV demonstrates the proposed models and mitigation 
strategy on the IEEE 118-bus system using the OPA model. 
Section V discussed the feasibility of the proposed 
algorithms in real power systems. Finally, this work is 
concluded in Section VI. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION OF INTERACTION GRAPH 
The interaction graph of a power system does not 
represent the actual topology of the grid. Its nodes represent 
the grid components, which are typically transmission lines 
and transformers, and its edges (or links) are used to 
measure influences between outages of components. There 
are the following three steps to build an interaction graph 
for a power system with n components with risks of 
overloading under cascading outages [34]. The interaction 
graph builds upon a so-called interaction matrix B. 
Step 1 generates a database of cascading outage 
scenarios, which are called “cascades” in the rest of this 
paper. Any cascading outage simulation based on 
engineering principles can be used to produce the data 
needed to synthesize the interaction graph. Then group 
these data into different stages within each cascade based 
on the sequences or timing of outages. Assume that the size 
of the database is K and m represents the stage. Assume M 
to be the maximum value of m. The grouped data can be 
illustrated as follows 
 
 
 
Step 2 constructs the interaction matrix B. Firstly, 
construct a matrix A∈ℤn×n whose entry aij is the number of 
times that component i fails in one stage before the failure 
of component j among all cascades. A cannot be used as the 
interaction matrix directly since it exaggerates the 
interactions between component failures, i.e., it asserts one 
component interacts with another one only because it fails 
in its last stage. Therefore, the causal relationships between 
failed components should be determined. Specifically, for 
any two consecutive stages, m and m+1 of any cascade x, 
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assume that the set of components in stage m is Cm, and 
component j failed in stage m+1. Then the component 
whose failure is considered to cause the failure of 
component j can be determined through Eq. (1). 
 
   and maxcc c c i j ijiI i i a a=  = mm CC   (1) 
 
Fig. 1 illustrates the determination process of 2 
consecutive stages of a cascade. Assume that the values of 
the edges satisfy Eq. (2) and Eq. (3).    
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From Fig. 1(a) to Fig. 1(b), the edges A → E, B → E, and 
C → D are removed, i.e., the elements aAE, aBE, and aBE are 
corrected to be 0. Therefore, the causal relationships are the 
failures of A and B cause the failure of D, and the failure of 
C causes the failure of E.  
 
A
ED
B C Stage m
Stage m+1
 
         (a) 
A
ED
B C Stage m
Stage m+1
 
         (b) 
FIGURE 1.  Determining process of two consecutive stages of a 
cascade. 
 
After determining the causal relationships for all 
cascades, A can be corrected to be Aʹ∈ℤn×n, whose entry 
aʹij is the number of times that the failure of component i 
causes the failure of component j. Then the interaction 
matrix B∈ℤn×n can be obtained from Aʹ. Its entry bij is the 
empirical probability that the failure of component i causes 
the failure of component j, which is given by 
 
ij
ij
i
a
b
N

=   (4) 
where Ni is the number of failures of component i. 
Step 3 builds the interaction graph model. The interaction 
matrix B∈ℤn×n determines how components interact with 
each other. The nonzero elements of B are called links. For 
instance, link l : i → j corresponds to B’s nonzero element 
bij and starts from component i and ends with component j. 
By putting all links together, an interaction graph denoted 
by G(C, L) can be obtained. Its vertices C are components, 
and each directed link l∈L represents that a failure of the 
source vertex component causes the failure of the 
destination vertex component with a probability bij. 
 
III. PROPOSED DIG BASED MITIGATION STRATEGY 
A. PROPOSED DYNAMIC INTERACTION GRAPH  
In this paper, the motivation for improving an interaction 
graph model to a DIG model is to make the graph be 
adaptively updated to reflect ongoing outages and online 
data so that the trend and consequences of outages can be 
more accurately predicted. That is vitally important for 
determining effective mitigation actions. Unlike existing 
interaction graph models, a DIG can update its topology, 
key components, key linkages and other parameters along 
with the propagation of outages.  
Define Bʹm as the dynamic interaction matrix on stage m. 
Assume that there is no component fails in stage 0, i.e., Bʹ0 
= B∈ℤn×n, and the initial faults happen starting from stage 
1. With the propagation of cascading outages, Bʹm (m > 0) 
needs to be corrected simultaneously. Assume that totally q 
components fail after m stages, whose indices form set Q. 
Thus, Bʹm can be obtained by removing the rows and 
columns corresponding to Q from Bʹ0. Each row indicates 
the influence of the failure of one component on the others 
and each column indicates the influences of the failures of 
the other components on this component. The dimension of 
Bʹm is reduced to (n - q) × (n -q). Its element bʹij is given by 
 
  ,ij ijb b i j =  Q Q   (5) 
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FIGURE 2.  A part of the DIG. 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates a part of the DIG, and the thickness of 
the links represents the link weights. Assume that 
component D fails in stage m-1, and then the dynamic 
interaction matrix Bʹm can be obtained by removing all the 
links pointing to D, i.e., I → D, B → D, and A → D, and all 
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the links start from D, i.e., D → A and D → F.  
The mathematical formulation of dynamic interaction 
matrix Bʹm on the condition of D fails is given by  
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Finally, a DIG Gʹ(Cʹ, Lʹ, m) can be obtained based on Bʹm. 
Note that the DIG downgrades to a static interaction graph 
when m = 0, i.e., Gʹ(Cʹ, Lʹ, 0) = G(C, L). 
B. THE QUANTIZATION OF DIG  
After deriving a DIG, how to online use its information 
for mitigation of cascading outages is the next problem. 
Considering generation re-dispatch as a feasible mitigation 
strategy, we may utilize quantitative information carried by 
DIG in an OPF model for solving the control strategy. This 
section will focus on how to obtain useful quantitative 
information from a DIG.  
For each stage m, define index ci,m as the expected 
number of outages that caused by the failure of component i. 
ci,m can be calculated through a unique directed acyclic 
subgraph which can be extracted from the DIG. Fig. 3 
illustrates the process of obtaining the directed acyclic 
subgraph Gʹ(i, m) regarding each component. Assume that 
there are more than 2 stages in this cascade, i.e., M ≥ 2 
(the subgraphs of m > 1 are not shown here).  
Fig. 3(a) is a subgraph extracted from DIG when m = 0. 
From Fig. 3(a) to Fig. 3(b), vertices H, I, and J, as shown 
by dashed circles, are removed since they have no paths 
from i or in other words are not influenced by the failure of 
i. Then these two types of edges (indicate by dotted arrows) 
are removed: ones coming from vertices of a future stage 
such as A → D and E → i, for causality between different 
stages, and the ones coming from vertices of the same stage 
such as B → D, for independency in the same stage. Then 
the directed acyclic subgraph Gʹ(i, 0), i.e., Fig. 3(b), is 
obtained for which there is no loop and for each vertex, 
there is exactly one vertex (i.e., the cause) pointing to it. 
Assume that component D fails in stage 1. From Fig. 3(b) 
to Fig. 3(c), i.e., Gʹ(i, 1), the vertices which D pointing to 
(A, F, dashed circles) and the corresponding links (J → D, 
D → A, D → F, dotted arrows) are removed since D cannot 
influence other components or be influenced. Therefore, 
Gʹ(i, m) will be dynamic varying with the operational 
condition when m ≥ 1. 
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FIGURE 3.  Diagram for obtaining the directed acyclic subgraph starting 
from i. 
 
Based on the directed acyclic subgraph Gʹ(i, m), the 
index ci,m for each component can be calculated by 
 
 ,
( , )
i m s sk
k i m
c E b

= 
C
  (7) 
 
where Cʹ(i, m) is the set of vertices in Gʹ(i, m). bsk is the sth 
row and kth column element of matrix Bʹm. Es is the 
expected number of outages of the source vertices that 
pointing to vertex k. Therefore, Esbsk gives the expected 
value of outages propagates from link s → k. Note that, 
since no source vertices are pointing to vertex i, Ei is set to 
be Ni / N0, i.e., the empirical probability of the failure of 
component i, where N0 is the size of the database.  
By taking ci,m as the weights of components, DIG can be 
transformed into a directed weighted graph. The greater ci,m 
is, the more critical the component is for the propagation of 
cascading outages. The top-ranked components are defined 
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as key components Ckey. Key components Ckey contains the 
critical information of DIG.  
C. PROPOSED DIG-OPF MODEL 
Eq. (8) to (13) are the mathematical formulation of a 
classical DC-OPF model, which is widely used in literature 
for simulation and control design with cascading outages, 
e.g., the OPA model and its many variants. In the rest of the 
paper, this DC-OPF model is referred to as a classical OPF 
model for comparison purposes.  
 
 min i i i i i
i G i L
c p W p P
 
+ −    (8) 
S.t. 
 A=F p   (9) 
 
1
0
n
i
i
p
=
=   (10) 
 0,i iP p i L     (11) 
 
max0 ,i ip P i G     (12) 
 max max−  F F F   (13) 
 
where G and L denote the generator set and load set 
respectively. ci is the generation cost coefficient for 
generator i. The coefficient Wi is the economic loss for the 
load i. pi is the active power injected at bus i, and p = (p1, …, 
pn)T is the vector of active power injections. Pi is the 
demand power at bus i, and Pimax is the maximum power 
limit for generator i. F and Fmax are the vectors of line 
flows and their limits.  
Define Mij = Fij / Fij,max as the overloading rate of the line 
connecting the nodes i and j, where Fij and Fij,max are the 
power flow and line flow limit of the line. A line with Mij < 
1 still has a margin to carry more power, but it may trip due 
to the unwanted operation of relay protection. The higher 
the Mij is, the larger the probability of unwanted operation 
is. On the other hand, a line with Mij ≥ 1 has no margin and 
has a probability of being tripped due to violating or 
bounding its thermal limit.  
The objective function, Eq. (8), is aiming to minimize the 
cost, and no constraints in the classical OPF model take into 
account the differences of vulnerabilities of transmission 
lines. Thus, the solution of the classical OPF model cannot 
take into account the consequences of the outages of 
components. Sometimes, the pursuit of a better economy 
may drive high Mij of one or more vulnerable transmission 
lines and even increase the risk of cascading outages.   
In order to improve the inadequacy of the classical OPF 
model, this paper proposed a novel DIG based OPF model 
(for short, DIG-OPF model) which can effectively reduce 
the risk of cascading outages. The mathematical 
formulation of the DIG-OPF model is the combination of 
the classical OPF model and the Eq. (14) given below. Eq. 
(14) is a new inequality constraint to take into account the 
consequences of the outages of key components.  
 max max
key key key −  F F F   (14) 
 
where Fkey and 
max
key
F  are the vectors of line flows and the 
limits of key components. α is a scaling coefficient of 0 to 1. 
With constraint (14), the power flows of the key 
components (i.e., transmission lines) are required to have a 
certain margin depending on  to the limits. In this way, the 
tripping probabilities of the key components will be greatly 
reduced. Since these key components play crucial roles in 
the propagation of cascading outages, reduce their tripping 
probabilities can significantly reduce the risk of large-scale 
cascading events. Therefore, the proposed DIG-OPF model 
is far more efficient than the classical OPF model in 
mitigating cascading outages. Note that, because key 
components are identified based on the DIG and will be 
updated with the change of network topology for accuracy, 
constraint (14) is in fact applied to a varying set of lines. 
An interpretation of constraint (14) is emulation of this 
practical operation: when cascading outages occur, the 
operator pays special attentions to a few more vulnerable 
lines and intentionally limit their power flows to reduce the 
overloading rate as well as the probability of unwanted 
tripping. Such a set of lines dynamically change at different 
stages of outages as told by the key components of the DIG. 
Note that a future power system will become more 
flexible through continuous penetration of power electronic 
devices such as FACTS and HVDC systems. These devices 
should be considered and modeled. Although the present 
version of the DIG-OPF model has not yet considered these 
devices, in theory, they can be added to the algorithm, 
which requires adding new equations and constraints to the 
problem. Some existing studies, e.g., [40]-[43], give useful 
guidance on how to model and add these devices.  
D. PROPOSED DIG BASED MITIGATION STRATEGY  
Fig. 4 presents the flowchart of the proposed DIG based 
mitigation strategy, and it performs the following steps.  
Step 1 generates the initial matrix Bʹ0 offline based on a 
database of cascading events. 
Step 2 detects the current network topology based on 
online data. The data can be provided by the Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system or 
algorithms based on real-time wide-area measurements. 
Step 3 updates the interaction matrix Bʹm using (5) and 
(6) to reflect the current topology.  
Step 4 ranks the components by the index ci,m which can 
be  calculated by (7), and then picks up a certain number, 
e.g., 20, of the top-ranked components as the key 
components (Ckey).  
Step 5 solves the proposed DIG-OPF, i.e., Eq. (8)-(14).  
Step 6 generates a list of re-dispatch generators. Compare 
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the presently scheduled generator outputs (obtained in the 
previous iteration of the algorithm) with the solution in Step 
5, and the generators whose output changes, form the re-
dispatch list. The corrective outputs of these re-dispatch 
generators are also based on the solution derived in Step 5. 
Step 7 performs mitigation control to increase the 
transfer margins of vulnerable lines. According to the 
solutions of DIG-OPF, the operators re-dispatch the 
generators provided by Step 6.  
 
Slove DIG-OPF 
Re-dispatch the outputs of the 
generators by operator
Topology 
detection
Generate initial dynamic 
matrix '
0B
  Update matrix '
mB
Identify the set of key 
components keyC
Generate a list of re-
dispatch generators
 
FIGURE 4.  The flowchart of the proposed mitigation strategy. 
 
Note that the optimal solution of the OPF algorithm 
usually requires to adjust the output levels of a large 
number of generators. This property is particularly 
undesirable in the current industry practices since the 
system operators may only be able to handle a limited 
number of corrective actions due to time and 
communication constraints. However, this issue itself, i.e., 
how to acquire a proper list of re-dispatch generators, is an 
important research topic in the study of security-constrained 
OPF, and a series of papers have discussed and proposed 
methods to resolve it [44]-[46]. Therefore, this paper 
focuses on studying the application of DIG in mitigating 
cascading outages and assume the operators are capable of 
handling all corrective actions provided by Step 6.  
 
IV. CASE STUDY ON THE OPA MODEL 
The proposed DIG model and associated mitigation 
strategy are tested on the IEEE 118-bus test system using 
the OPA model in MATLAB 2018b environment. The OPA 
model contains two layers of iterations. The inner iterations 
are concerned with power-flow based simulation of grid 
operations under outages, referred to as “fast dynamics”, 
and the outer iterations are about the long-term planning 
process, referred to as “slow dynamics”, which simulate the 
growth and upgrading of the transmission network with the 
increases of generation and load. In this paper, only the 
inner iterations are considered.  
In the rest of the paper, the OPA model and its settings 
are based on [13]. The parameters are set as follows: The 
initial failure probability of each line is assumed to be 0.01. 
The probability of tripping overloaded lines is set to be 
0.999. The probability of tripping normal lines is set to be 
0.001×(Mij)n, where 0.001 is the base probability of 
unwanted operation of relay protection. n is set to be 10 
since the higher the load rate is, the larger the probability of 
unwanted operation is. The coefficient α in the proposed 
DIG-OPF model is set to be 0.85, and the explanation of 
how to set α will be given in Section V.C.  
A. GENERATE THE DATABASE AND BUILDING IG (DIG 
FOR M=0)  
Generate a database with 10,000 cascades using the OPA 
model. The conventional interaction graph (for short, IG, 
i.e., the DIG with m=0) can be derived base on the three 
steps in Section II.  
Rank the components by index ci,m. Pick up the top 20 
components as the key components which are shown in Tab. 
1 and Fig. 5(a). Line 92-89 in Tab. 1 has two parallel lines.  
 
TABLE I 
KEY COMPONENTS OF IG (DIG WITH M=0) 
Line Line Line Line 
66-62 77-75 32-31 17-15 
92-89 (1) 92-89 (2) 19-18 89-85 
72-24 100-99 70-24 70-69 
34-19 42-40 103-100 42-41 
105-104 92-91 37-33 66-49 
 
B. DYNAMIC UPDATES OF KEY COMPONENTS WITH A 
SPECIFIC CASCADE  
For a specific cascade, the key components of the DIG 
should vary with the changing of network topology. Fig. 5 
illustrates the dynamic changing process of a specific 
cascade. Tab. 2 gives the failed components.  
In stage 0, there was no component failed. The DIG has 
the same key components as the IG. In stage 1, there were 6 
components outages, which caused a significant change of 
the key components. From Fig. 5(a) to (b), there are 4 key 
components changed. From Fig. 5(b) to (c), the number 
increases to 9 dues to the 6 outages in stage 2.  
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 (b) Updated key components in stage 1. 
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FIGURE 5.  The variation of key components of a specific cascade. 
 
TABLE II 
FAILED COMPONENTS  
m Line Line Line Line Line Line 
0 NONE 
1 15-14 34-19 66-62 71-70 72-24 100-99 
2 19-18 42-40 70-24 77-75 79-78 105-104 
 
Since the key components are essential to the proposed 
DIG-based mitigation strategy, the average number of the 
change of key components in each stage are calculated and 
shown in Fig. 6. The results indicate that the key 
components can change significantly, which cannot be 
easily neglected. Moreover, the average number increases 
as the stage increases. It is reasonable since the change of 
key components is caused by the change of network 
topology. The more stages usually lead to more outages.  
 
FIGURE 6.  The average number of changed key components of each 
stage. 
C. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED MITIGATION 
STRATEGY  
The performance of the proposed DIG based mitigation 
strategy is tested and compared with other three mitigation 
strategies in this section. All the cases use the OPA model 
to simulate, but the mitigation modules are different. The 
details are as follows: 
Case A: The mitigation module uses the classical OPF 
model, i.e., Eq. (8)-(13), which is remarked as classical-
OPF. 
Case B: The mitigation module uses the DIG-OPF model, 
i.e., Equation (8)-(14), but the key components in constraint 
(14) are randomly selected. This case is remarked as 
random-OPF. 
Case C: The mitigation module uses the DIG-OPF model, 
but the key components in constraint (14) are selected 
based on IG (the DIG with m=0), which is remarked as IG-
OPF. 
Case D: The mitigation module uses the DIG-OPF model, 
and the key components in constraint (14) are selected 
based on DIG, which is remarked as DIG-OPF. 
Fig. 7 gives the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) 
curves of the four cases about line outages. The procedure 
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of calculating PDF is as follows: First, set the bin width of 
continuous variable x. Then, count the number of cascades 
that variable y (y represents the number of lines failed) falls 
into one bin.  
 
 
FIGURE 7.  The PDF of line outages. (classical-OPF uses the classical 
OPF model, i.e., Eq. (8)-(13); random-OPF uses the DIG-OPF model, i.e., 
Equation (8)-(14), but the key components in constraint (14) are 
randomly selected; IG-OPF uses the DIG-OPF model, but the key 
components in constraint (14) are selected based on IG; DIG-OPF uses 
the DIG-OPF model, and the key components in constraint (14) are 
selected based on DIG) 
 
In Fig. 7, the curve of random-OPF coincides with the 
curve of classical-OPF, which means random-OPF is no 
better than classical-OPF. It is reasonable since most of the 
randomly selected components are not crucial in the 
propagation of cascading events, thus reduce the failure 
probabilities of them cannot enhance the ability to mitigate 
cascading outages. However, when analysis the result of 
IG-OPF, it is obvious that the probability of small-scale 
cascades in IG-OPF is much higher than those in classical-
OPF, whereas the probability of the large-scale cascades in 
IG-OPF is much lower than those in classical-OPF. 
Therefore, compare to classical-OPF, IG-OPF can 
significantly enhance the ability against cascading outages. 
Finally, as we expected, the probability of large-scale 
cascades in DIG-OPF is even lower than those in IG-OPF, 
which means DIG-OPF is more efficient than IG-OPF, 
especially for preventing large-scale cascades.   
Plot the number of large-scale cascades which has more 
than 10 outages in Fig. 8. All the results are normalized to 
Case A. Fig. 8 indicates that the value of random-OPF is 
almost the same with classical-OPF, whereas IG-OPF 
reduces 90.48% large-scale cascades. Finally, the best 
performance one is DIG-OPF since it reduces 96.5% of 
large-scale cascades. 
Since the amount of load shedding is another important 
metric of cascading events, the statistical results of load 
loss are also given. The average load shedding of each 
cascade is shown in Fig. 9. The number of cascades, which 
lost more than 5% of the total load demand, is given in Fig.  
10. All the results are normalized to Case A.  
Case A: classical-OPF
Case B: random-OPF
Case C: IG-OPF
Case D: DIG-OPF
100(%) 99.9(%)
9.52(%)
3.50(%)
 
FIGURE 8.  The number of large-scale cascades. (more than 10 outages) 
 
100(%)
15.3(%)
105(%)
11.9(%)
Case A: classical-OPF
Case B: random-OPF
Case C: IG-OPF
Case D: DIG-OPF
 
FIGURE 9.  The average load shedding of each cascade. 
 
100(%)
15.7(%)
108(%)
3.13(%)
Case A: classical-OPF
Case B: random-OPF
Case C: IG-OPF
Case D: DIG-OPF
 
FIGURE 10.  The number of cascades, which lost more than 5% of the 
total load demand. 
 
The results in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 are consistent with the 
results of the outages, i.e., both IG-OPF and DIG-OPF can 
significantly mitigate the load loss, but DIG-OPF is more 
efficient than IG-OPF. 
The excellent performance of DIG-OPF attributed to the 
addition of constraint (14) and the well selection of key 
components. The key components selected based on DIG 
are the most crucial ones whose outages may cause serious 
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consequences. By using constraint (14) to reduce the failure 
probabilities of the key components, the risky of large-scale 
cascades can be greatly reduced. Moreover, DIG-OPF has 
better performance than IG-OPF since the DIG more 
accurately reflect the changing vulnerabilities of the power 
network than IG. 
 
V.  DISCUSSION ON THE FEASIBILITY OF USING DIG-
OPF IN REAL POWER SYSTEMS 
A. COMPUTATION TIME AND CONVERGENCE OF DIG-
OPF 
Despite many excellent studies, e.g., [47] and [48], 
solving OPF problems with AC power flow constraints is 
still a major challenge in power system analysis due to 
convergence and time-consuming issues. At the same time, 
OPF with DC power flows is widely used in grid operations 
by the power industry. The above considerations motivate 
us to use the DC power flow model in the OPF problem in 
this paper. Therefore, the proposed DIG-OPF algorithm has 
the merit of DC OPF, i.e., it has more robust convergence 
and can be solved very fast. For Case D in Section IV, the 
proposed algorithm is tested on a PC configured with Intel 
(R) Core i7-6700 CPU, 3.4 GHz, and 16 GB RAM, and the 
average computation time is within 2 seconds, which is 
acceptable in practical applications. 
B. TESTS ON AN AC POWER FLOW MODEL 
In Section IV, we have used the DC-OPA model to test 
the proposed mitigation strategy and explain its mechanism. 
However, since the DC-OPA model is based only on DC 
power flow, the feasibility of the proposed method in the 
real systems should be further discussed. To address this 
concern, a new AC power flow model is built, and its 
flowchart is shown in Fig. 11. This new model is referred to 
as the “AC test model” in the rest of the paper. 
In Fig. 11, only the proposed control module still uses 
DC power flow (in the blue box), all other parts use AC 
power flow to more accurately simulate the real power 
system. By using the AC test model, the response of the 
systems can be well simulated after the operator re-
dispatched the generators based on DIG-OPF. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation strategy 
considering AC power flows is tested. 
Because this paper focuses on studies of cascading 
outages mainly caused by component failures due to 
overloading, it should be noted that both the DC and AC 
power flow models are steady state models ignoring 
transient dynamics. Moreover, a simplified load shedding 
scheme is added to the AC test model to coordinate with the 
proposed mitigation strategy. More practical load shedding 
schemes, such as the schemes in Ref. [49] and Ref. [50], 
can easily be integrated into the AC test model. 
Test the proposed mitigation strategy on IEEE 118 
system using the AC test model. The load factor is set to be 
1.0. The parameters of DIG-OPF are set as follows: the 
scaling factor α in (14) is set to be 0.7, the explanation of 
how to choose α will be given in Section V.C. Other 
parameters are the same as the setting in Section IV.  
 
Start
Random outage
AC power flows
Is there any 
overload line?
Shed 10% load of the 
buses connected 
overloaded lines
Is there any 
overload line?
Shed all load?
Y
Y
N
Y
Update network
N
N
End
Solve DIG-OPF
Generation 
redispatch
 AC power flows
Is there any 
overload line?
Y
N
Trip the overloaded 
lines with 
probability P
 
FIGURE 11.  The flowchart of the AC test model. 
 
Generate a database with 10,000 cascades using the AC 
test model, then change the DIG-OPF to classical-OPF and 
regenerate 10,000 cascades to compare results. All the 
statistical results are normalized to the classical-OPF. The 
comparison results are given in Fig. 12. 
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FIGURE 12.  The comparison results of line outage and load lost, 
respectively. 
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Fig. 12 shows that the proposed DIG-OPF based 
mitigation strategy reduces 89.4% average line outages, 
97.3% large-scale cascades (line outage), 86.7% average 
load lost, and 97.5% large-scale cascades (load lost). These 
results prove that the proposed method has potential in 
applications for real power systems. 
C. DISCUSSION OF SETTING THE SCALING FACTOR α 
The scaling factor α was set to be 0.85 and 0.7 in Section 
IV and Section V.B, respectively, but the explanation of 
how to set this coefficient has not been given yet.  
According to the analysis in Section III.C, the 
mechanism of mitigating cascading outages by using DIG-
OPF is that it reduces the tripping probabilities of key 
components through constraint (14). Since DIG-OPF based 
on DC power flow, its calculating results may not very 
accurate. Therefore, the scaling factor α should be lower 
enough to ensure the power flows on the vulnerable lines 
within their limits.  
In the range of 0 to 1, the value of α is set to be 0.05, 
0.10, 0.15, …, and 1.00, at intervals of 0.05. Then using the 
AC test model to generate 20 databases, and each database 
corresponds to a different α. The statistical results are 
shown in Fig. 13 and Fig.14. All the results are normalized 
to the classical-OPF. 
 
 
FIGURE 13.  The comparison results of line outage when α changes. 
 
 
FIGURE 14.  The comparison results of load lost when α changes. 
In Fig. 13 and Fig. 14, all the curves cliffy drop when α 
decreases from 1.00 to 0.85. It is reasonable since the 
difference between the results of DC power flow and AC 
power flow is usually not very large, and setting α below 
0.85 can effectively limit most of the line flows within their 
limits. On the other hand, the curves increase with the 
decrease of α when α is smaller than 0.4. That is because 
when the DIG-OPF algorithm intentional increases the 
transfer margins of the vulnerable lines, it also drives the 
power flows on other lines more likely to violate their 
limits. Therefore, setting α between 0.4 and 0.85 can make 
the proposed mitigation strategy perform best. 
D. DISCUSSION OF THE IMPACTS OF RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SOURCES 
If a future power grid contains a majority of intermittent, 
undispatchable renewable energy sources, that may affect 
the accuracy of the proposed algorithm since the algorithm 
assumes a power system based mainly on conventional 
power plants, which can be dispatched by utility companies 
or system operators. Variable outputs of renewable energy 
sources will bring uncertainties to success of the proposed 
mitigation strategy. However, this is a challenging problem 
faced by many online applications for power grid 
operations and control in both normal and abnormal 
conditions. It is envisioned that uncertainties with 
renewable energy resources could be reduced or 
compensated by increasing energy storage devices or by 
new control techniques allowing renewable generations to 
operate in an inertial emulation mode like synchronous 
machines. Also, the power electronic interfaces allow more 
flexible control of both active and reactive powers to help 
support the grid. Thus, they can become more dispatchable 
and controllable under emergency conditions to cascading 
outages. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper proposed a DIG model to make the interaction 
graph model more adaptive to ongoing outages such that 
outage propagation can be mitigated online. The parameters 
of DIG can vary with the changing of network topology, 
which makes key components of the DIG more accurately 
reflect the changing vulnerabilities of the power network.  
Based on DIG, a novel mitigation strategy was proposed. 
In this strategy, the DIG is defined as a constraint and then 
added to the classical OPF model for generation re-dispatch 
to increase transfer margins of vulnerable lines. The 
numerical results on the IEEE 118-bus system have shown 
that the DIG based control strategy can effectively mitigate 
cascading outages. 
In practice, the proposed methods can give useful 
guidance to the operators. First, the DIG model can 
dynamically identify the vulnerable components online, 
thus the operators can save their attention to a small set of 
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components. Second, the proposed DIG-OPF model can 
provide reference solutions that the operators can refer to 
for reducing the risk of cascading outages.   
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